Interacting with an inferred world: the challenge of machine learning for humane computer interaction by Blackwell, Alan
Interacting with an Inferred World: The Challenge of 
Machine Learning for Humane Computer Interaction 
  Alan F. Blackwell  
University of Cambridge 
Computer Laboratory 
afb21@cam.ac.uk 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Classic theories of user interaction have been framed in 
relation to symbolic models of planning and problem 
solving, responding in part to the cognitive theories 
associated with AI research. However, the behavior of 
modern machine-learning systems is determined by 
statistical models of the world rather than explicit symbolic 
descriptions. Users increasingly interact with the world and 
with others in ways that are mediated by such models. This 
paper explores the way in which this new generation of 
technology raises fresh challenges for the critical evaluation 
of interactive systems. It closes with some proposed 
measures for the design of inference-based systems that are 
more open to humane design and use. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Anxiety about artificial intelligence (AI) has pervaded 
Western culture for 50 years - or perhaps 500. As I write, 
the BBC News headline reads Microsoft's Bill Gates insists 
AI is a threat, while the Cambridge Centre for Existential 
Risk, led by past Royal Society President and Astronomer 
Royal Sir Martin Rees, lists AI as the first in its list of the 
technologies that may represent ‘direct, extinction-level 
threats to our species’. The legend of the Golem and other 
examples from fiction demonstrate human unease about 
machines that act for themselves. Of course, this ability is 
shared by devices as humble as the thermostat, the sat-nav, 
or predictive text – all somewhat mysterious to their users, 
and all possessing some kind of ‘mind’ – that is, an internal 
model of the world that determines system behavior. 
The goal of this paper is to analyze the ways in which our 
relationship with such devices and systems is changing, in 
response to the continued developments arising from 
Moore's Law (namely, the scale and complexity of their 
internal models) and the economics of network connectivity 
(the range of data from which models can be derived). One 
set of concerns about those changes of scale is now familiar 
as an implication of the phrase ‘big data’ [9], but I contend 
that the real problem is more insidious - that it results from 
changes in the technical underpinnings of artificial 
intelligence research, which are in turn changing designers’ 
conceptions of the human user. The danger is not the 
creation of systems that become maliciously intelligent, but 
of systems that are designed to be inhumane through 
neglect of the individual, social and political consequences 
of technical decisions. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The first section 
discusses the nature of the intellectual changes that have 
accompanied developments in AI technology. For many 
years, researchers in Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) 
have been concerned about the consequences of AI, but I 
argue that it is time for some fundamental changes in the 
questions asked. The second section takes a specific 
research project as a focal case study. That project was not 
designed as an interactive system, but suggests future 
scenarios of interaction that seem particularly disturbing. I 
use the case study as a starting point from which several 
key concerns of humane interaction can be explored, 
introducing questions of human rights, law and political 
economics. The final section is more technically oriented, 
describing practical tests available to the critical technical 
practitioner, followed by a selection of research themes that 
might be used to explore more humane interaction modes. 
BACKGROUND 
In recognition of the long view taken at this conference, I 
will set out the development of these concerns over a 
relatively extended time-frame. The phrase big data has 
only recently become popular as a marketing term, 
promoting the potential for statistical analysis to model the 
world by extracting patterns from data that is becoming 
more readily available. The Machine Learning techniques 
used to create such models have supplanted earlier AI 
technology booms such as symbol-manipulation methods in 
the Expert Systems of the 1980s – now remembered 
nostalgically as GOFAI, for ‘Good Old-Fashioned AI’. 
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These changing trends are significant to Human-Computer 
Interaction (HCI) because GOFAI has long had a 
problematic relationship with HCI – as a kind of 
quarrelsome sibling. Both fields brought together 
knowledge from Psychology and Computer Science, to an 
extent that in the early days of HCI, it was difficult to 
distinguish HCI from AI or Cognitive Science. The 
program of work at Xerox PARC that resulted in the 
seminal book The Psychology of Human-Computer 
Interaction [10] was initiated by a proposal from Allen 
Newell filed as Applied Information-Processing Psychology 
Project Memo Number 1[25], while Norman and Draper's 
UCSD book (User Centered System Design) [28] punningly 
emerged from the Cognitive Science department at UCSD 
(UC San Diego). Many early HCI researchers had taken 
degrees in AI or Cognitive Science (including the current 
author). Even today, popular accounts of HCI research, 
referencing both psychology and computing, often result in 
the naive assumption that we must be doing AI. 
However, the years of the 1980s Expert Systems boom 
were also associated with a critical reaction. The ‘strong 
AI’ position anticipated computers that could pass the 
Turing Test and simulate people. This possibility was 
challenged not only by philosophers of mind, but by 
researchers concerned with HCI such as Winograd and 
Flores [39], Gill [16], and Suchman [35], all of whom noted 
the ways in which symbolic problem-solving algorithms 
neglected issues that were central to human interaction, 
including social context, physical embodiment, and action 
in the world. Each of these researchers had distinct 
concerns, but these can be summarized in their reception by 
AI researchers as problems of situated cognition – the 
failure of formal computational models of planning and 
action to deal with the complexity of the real world, where 
actions seem more often improvised in response to events 
and situations [1, 29].  
Although the phrase ‘situated cognition’ has become tainted 
by debate and controversy, these debates between HCI and 
symbol-processing AI have been underlying concerns of 
major theoretical contributions in HCI, such as Dourish's 
discussions of context and embodiment [14, 15], and 
concepts of interaction offered as design resources in a 
critical technical practice [2, 20]. 
The New Critical Landscape 
The goal of this paper is to explore the ways in which this 
continued central tension in HCI is now changing in 
fundamental ways, because of the technical differences 
between the methods of GOFAI, and those that are now 
predominant in Machine Learning (ML). Where symbol-
processing approaches failed to take account of the rich 
information available in the world, ML algorithms have 
access to huge quantities of such information. This has 
resulted in enormous changes, by comparison to the 
technical and commercial context in which the field of HCI 
was formed.  
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Table 1. Structural analogy of the new technical context for 
HCI, with the focus of this paper as a new critical question. 
To summarize those changes, and also the central analogy 
leading to the concern of this paper, Table 1 outlines the 
relationship between the technoscience landscape of 
GOFAI that laid the context for HCI in the 1980s, and the 
corresponding scientific, technical and business trends to 
which we should be responding today. 
The critical challenges to symbol-processing GOFAI were 
that the symbols were not grounded, the cognition was not 
situated, and there was no interaction with social context. 
These are not the critical problems of the ML landscape. In 
contrast to those earlier critiques, machine learning systems 
operate purely on ‘grounded’ data, and their ‘cognition’ is 
based wholly on information collected from the real world. 
Furthermore, it appears that ML systems are interacting 
with their social context, for example through the use of big 
data collected from social networks, personal databases, 
online business and so on. However, this question of 
interacting with social data introduces the most important 
critical concern of this paper.  
This concern can be framed in terms of the Turing Test. In 
that test, judges are asked to distinguish between a human 
and a computer. In the classic formulation, we wish to see if 
the computer will appear sufficiently human-like that the 
two cannot be distinguished. However, I am more 
concerned with the reverse scenario. What if the human and 
computer cannot be distinguished because the human has 
become too much like a computer?  
The original version of the Turing Test fails for all the 
reasons identified in the 1980s HCI critiques of AI. The 
new version ‘passes’ the Turing Test, but in a way that 
demands a new critique. My concern is that reducing 
humans to acting as data sources is fundamentally 
inhumane. A serious additional concern is that technical 
optimists appear to be blind to this problem – perhaps 
because of their excitement as they finally seem to be 
approaching the scientific ‘goal’ of the Turing Test. HCI 
researchers and other critical practitioners should be alert to 
these technical developments, and be ready to draw 
attention to their consequences. 
This is particularly important because, whereas Expert 
Systems attracted much technical excitement in the 1980s, 
they were not widely deployed – at least, not to the extent 
that ordinary people would interact with them every day. In 
contrast, the statistical techniques of ML are now widely 
deployed in interactive commercial products. Everyday 
examples include the Pagerank algorithm of Google, 
Microsoft's Kinect motion-tracking interface, many 
different mobile predictive text entry systems, Amazon's 
recommendation engine and so on. If there is a critical 
problem, it is not simply an academic or philosophical 
concern about a speculative future of intelligent machines. 
On the contrary, I believe this may be a fundamental 
problem for contemporary society. 
To summarise this section, it has drawn comparisons 
between the technical trends that inspired the HCI critiques 
of the 1980s, and the technical trends of today. Much theory 
in contemporary HCI originally emerged from those 1980s 
critiques of symbol-processing AI. But whereas the core 
problem of symbol-processing AI was its lack of 
connection to context – the problem of situated cognition – 
the core problem of machine learning is the way in which it 
reduces the contextualised human to a machine-like source 
of interaction data. Rather than cognition that is not 
situated, our new concern should be interaction that is not 
humane. 
AN OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEM 
The key question is whether ML systems, which create their 
own implicit internal model of the world through inference 
rather than an explicit symbolic model, carry new 
consequences for those interacting with them. There are 
some existing concerns regarding the epistemological status 
of such systems.  
One is summarised by Breiman [7] as resulting from ‘two 
cultures’ of statistical modeling. Breiman contrasts the 
traditional practice of a statistician building and testing a 
mathematical model of the world, to ML techniques in 
which the model is inferred directly from data. He observes 
that “nature produces data in a black box whose insides are 
complex, mysterious, and, at least, partly unknowable” [7, 
p.205]. As a result, rather than following Occam’s razor, he 
believes that “the models that best emulate nature in terms 
of predictive accuracy are also the most complex and 
inscrutable” [7, p 209]. 
Breiman’s analysis, if correct (there are objectors), suggests 
that predictive accuracy is more important than 
interpretability. Systems built around such models therefore 
predict the state of the world and the people in the world, 
including the actions of the user, without offering an 
explicit symbolic explanation. One consequence of 
collecting data without explaining why is to trigger the 
now-familiar concerns of surveillance and privacy 
associated with ‘big data’. More subtle is the consequence 
of interacting with the world through the mediation of a 
model that purports to explain the user, yet cannot explain 
itself. 
This second concern has been elaborated in debate between 
Norvig and Chomsky [30]. Chomsky questions the value of 
models that contain no symbols for us to inspect, while 
Norvig observes that these models clearly work, and have 
supplanted symbolic models as a result. As with Breiman’s 
Two Cultures essay, this is partly an appeal to technological 
pragmatism over epistemological reservations – Breiman 
himself says “the goal is not interpretability, but accurate 
information” [7, p 210]. However, if this is the case, it is 
reasonable to ask whether the most pragmatic approach will 
necessarily be the most humane. 
These questions are located in a complex nexus of technical 
and psychological considerations. Before exploring them 
further, I illustrate that context with a specific case study of 
research within this nexus. In the following discussion, the 
case study also serves as a useful (and, by intention, slightly 
distanced from HCI) concrete example. 
CASE STUDY: READING THE MIND 
My case study comes from the work of Jack Gallant’s 
research group, described as ‘reconstructing visual 
experiences from brain activity’ [27]. Generating wide 
public interest from the disturbing suggestion that his team 
had created a mind-reading machine, this ML system 
retrieved film clips from a database according to the 
similarity of EEG readings taken while people watched the 
films. Press reports and publications were accompanied by 
images such as that in Fig. 1, showing (on the left) a still 
from the film that had been shown to an experimental 
subject, together with (on the right) a ‘mind-reading’ result 
that was often interpreted as the rendering of an image 
captured from within the brain of the subject. 
 
Figure 1. A visual image reconstructed from brain 
activity, as reported in [27] (image reproduced with 
permission of the authors, extracted from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nsjDnYxJ0bo, and 
reused under CCA license). The left side of the figure 
shows a film scene presented to an experimental subject. 
The right side is a reconstructed image informed by EEG 
measurements from the subject’s brain. 
The visual rhetoric in these scientific illustrations is 
compelling. The captured mind-image on the right of Fig. 1 
resembles an oil painting by Goya or by Turner, an artistic 
rendering of the deep unconscious. The image on the left is 
a scene from a Steve Martin film – reminding us of 
Martin’s classic riffs on disembodied brains (The Man with 
Two Brains, 1983) and mind-body exchange (All of Me, 
1984). But on closer inspection, the resemblance between 
the right and left halves is rather slim. Why does the 
reconstructed image have dark hair rather than white? Why 
is it not wearing a white shirt? In fact, all we can say for 
sure is that there appears to be a human figure on the right 
of the frame. We are sure because we see its face – as 
plainly as we see a face in the moon! 
Of course, humans (in the Northern hemisphere) observe a 
face in the moon because human brains, as with the brains 
of all social mammals, have evolved to detect faces well. If 
one were to record EEG signals while humans observe a 
wide range of different images, we might be confident that 
images of faces would result in some of the most distinctive 
signals. We also know that each hemisphere of the brain 
responds to only one half of the visual field, so the simplest 
possible inference is to determine the side of the head on 
which a signal has been detected. 
So, this is a point at which one might ask more closely how 
this image of the unconscious was painted. Might it be 
possible to construct such an image, if the ML model were 
so crude as to encode only the presence of a face on one 
side or other of the visual field? It seems, from close 
reading of the research described, that the right hand image 
is a blurred average of the 100 film library scenes most 
closely fitting the observed EEG signal. That is, it is a 
blurred combination of 100 film scenes in which a face 
appears in the right hand side of the frame. The other visual 
features, given this starting point, are unexceptional. The 
location of the face within the right hand side follows a 
completely conventional film frame composition. The face 
is located by the rule of two thirds, and the gaze of the 
figure is directed inward to the center of the frame. In fact, 
this could be a scene from any film at all.  
The rhetorical skill of the researchers in constructing this 
striking image is to have chosen just the right number of 
film scenes to average. A composite of only one or two 
scenes would retain sufficiently clear visual features to 
make it obvious if we were not looking at the right film. On 
the other hand, an average of 10,000 scenes would be no 
more than a brown smear, losing the powerful hints of 
contour and shadow that remind us of dream paintings. 
Even the level of detail used in the averaging process seems 
carefully chosen – the unit pixels, the hints of vertical lines 
suggesting scenery – are the size and shape of brush strokes 
to further evoke painterly rendering. 
In this case study, we can admire the skill of the researchers 
in presenting such a compelling story. However, this 
example also provides an opportunity to discuss some 
essential considerations in the critical assessment of ML 
models. I will not dwell further on the visual rhetoric of 
scientific discourse, despite the fact that the case raises 
fascinating questions in that area too. 
From Case Study to Critical Questions 
This case study has illustrated typical techniques from ML 
and neuroscience that might (if they worked in the manner 
implied) provide a basis for new models of user interaction 
that would be able to predict the user’s needs. A ‘natural’ 
brain-computer interface of this kind has not yet been 
proposed – though it may come soon! However, the case 
study can also be used as a starting point for critical 
enquiry.  
The central part of this paper explores the resulting 
questions. The following sections draw out these questions 
in turn, starting with those that arise directly from the 
domain of film – art works and their readers – but then 
moving on to the economic and psychological networks in 
which artworks are embedded. 
QUESTION 1: AUTHORSHIP 
GOFAI systems maintained a clear distinction between data 
(symbolic representations of the world), and algorithms that 
processed this data. In the modern digital economy, business 
and legal frameworks still maintain a clear distinction 
between (data-like) content and (algorithm-like) services. 
However, the behavior of ML systems is derived from data, 
through the construction of the statistical model. 
The image in Fig. 1 appeared meaningful because it was 
derived from actual movie scenes. Similarly, ML-based 
interactive technologies such as the Microsoft Kinect game 
controller are able to recognize human actions because their 
models have been derived from a large database of human 
actions [33]. In one sense, these statistical models can be 
regarded as an index of the content that created them, 
allowing the system to look up an interpretation that was 
originally created by a human author. 
This close relationship between index and authorship has 
been a focus of critical inquiry in the past, for example in 
Borges’ Library of Babel [8], which contained every 
possible book in the universe that could be written in an 
alphabet of 25 characters. If there were a catalogue to this 
library, its index would have to contain the full text of the 
book itself, to distinguish each book from the volume that is 
identical apart from a single character. Borges’ Library was 
a thought experiment, but we do now have ML algorithms 
that index (nearly) every book in the world, meaning that 
their models incorporate a significant proportion of those 
books’ content. However, the algorithm collecting an index 
does not care whether the data is copyrighted – despite the 
fact that the copyrighted content is in some way mashed-up 
into the structure of the resulting model. 
To consider the implications, imagine a dynamic audio 
filter trained on a single song – perhaps John Lennon's 
Imagine. If allowed to process sufficient random noise, this 
filter could select enough sounds to reproduce the song. If 
applied to any other song, it selects only those parts of the 
song that resemble Imagine. The model is not far from 
being a copy. But what if we trained the model on two 
Lennon songs, or on the whole Beatles repertoire, to the 
extent that it selects or simulates that repertoire? This is not 
dissimilar to the ‘reconstructed’ film scene described in the 
experiment above, although we are closer to technical 
feasibility with audio than with film (e.g. [12]). 
The ethics of copyright are a common enough topic in 
critiques of digital media. However, rather than purely 
considering the professional arts (loudly defended by 
copyright holders in the media industries), we should also 
consider the ways in which every digital citizen is an 
‘author’ of their own identity, because of the ways that 
persistent traces of our experiences and interactions with 
others are now extending beyond our own memories into 
digital representations. The human self is a narrative of 
experiences and relations with others, and ownership of this 
narrative is a critical condition of being human. I return to 
this issue later. 
QUESTION 2: ATTRIBUTION 
The logic of digital copyright would assert that the content 
of the original material captured in an ML model or index 
should still be traced to the authors – the scale of the 
appropriation is not the key legal point. However, indexing 
of the Internet is still heavily influenced by rather utopian 
perspectives derived from champions of the public domain 
in which it is often asserted that ‘information wants to be 
free’ (attributed to Stewart Brand). But if we acknowledge 
that ‘information’ represents the work and property of 
individuals, then ‘freedom’ might simply mean the freedom 
to appropriate that work by those wishing to encode it in the 
form of ML models, especially if there are no copyright 
holders leaping to defend their license revenue.  
Attribution is already problematic in digital media, as a 
result of postmodern collaging practices – remixes, 
mashups and so on. Experts in forensic musicology report 
that court decisions are contingent on the availability of 
uncontestable symbolic representations [3]. Lyrics are easy 
to defend. Melodies likewise, so long as they can be written 
out as notes on a scale. However, reprocessed samples are 
more ambiguous, and distinctive digital production 
techniques almost impossible to verify without separate 
evidence of provenance. The law is a symbolic system, and 
it works well only with symbolic data. 
The commercial logic applied in digital music licensing (in 
particular, within sample-based genres) is a logic of 
contamination – the inclusion of any data fragment results 
in a derived work, meaning that attribution is required and 
license fees payable. In contrast, the application of 
processes and algorithms (whether Autotune, or a fuzzbox) 
does not imply that the inventor of the fuzzbox owns the 
song recorded with it. If ML models are interpreted (and 
applied) as processes, this is a challenge for attribution. 
Although they resemble a purely algorithmic construct, they 
are also a kind of intertextual content derived from the data 
used to train them (just as a John Lennon ‘filter’ represents 
all possible John Lennon songs, even including those not 
written, but predicted from his body of work). 
This situation is exacerbated by the fact that, when we 
interact with computer systems, we often over-attribute 
intelligence to the system, failing to recognize the fact that 
apparent intelligence, in a system that is in some way faulty 
or ambiguous, may arise from our own judgments. Collins 
and Kusch describe this dynamic as ‘Repair, Attribution 
and all That’ (RAT) [11]. RAT explains the enthusiastic 
popular reception of the mind-reading demonstration in 
Figure 1. Although clearly a poor reproduction of the 
original scene, the human observer ‘repairs’ this, 
interpreting the computer output as an accurate portrayal of 
a dream, and attributing their own subsequent interpretation 
of that ambiguous image as resulting from the apparent 
intelligence of the system that produced it. 
In symbolic systems, where the system behavior has been 
specified and encoded directly by a human designer, the 
user can apply a semiotic reading in which the user 
interface acts as the ‘designer’s deputy’ [34]. In contrast, if 
the system behavior is encoded in a statistical model, 
derived by inference from the work of many authors, and 
presented to users in a context where any faults are repaired 
and attributed to the intelligence of the system itself, then 
this humane foundation of the semiotic system is 
undermined. 
Models derived from big data defy symbolic representation, 
because the scale and complexity of the data processing 
algorithms makes it very difficult (or even impossible) to 
‘run them backward’ and recover the necessary links for 
human attribution. We can choose to treat such dynamics as 
a necessary sacrifice for the public good of the creative 
commons, supporting a massive global project of 
postmodern collaging. However, if we are accelerating the 
death of the author through technical means, then who will 
get paid? 
QUESTION 3: REWARD 
Attribution of authorship is considered an inalienable 
human right [37]. However, as noted by Scherzinger [32], 
the digital public domain pays lip service to attribution of 
authorship, while actually providing unfettered access to 
commercial interests. Global indexing and data-centric 
service models represent a new era of enclosures, echoing 
the enclosure of common grazing land by the British 
aristocracy. In particular, Scherzinger notes that there is a 
tendency for the information assets of the global South to 
be incorporated into the ‘public domain’ administered from 
the North, while the revenue in services derived from those 
assets continues to flow from the South to the North. 
I have already discussed the way in which the separation of 
data and algorithms in the systems of the GOFAI era has 
become far less distinct in the statistical models that 
underlie the behavior of ML devices such as Kinect. There 
is a commercial analog to this technical change, in the 
relationship between content and services. In the 
contemporary digital economy, we retain a notional 
separation between content and services. However, in 
practice, the corporations responsible for digital 
infrastructure ‘ecosystems’ find it useful to blur those 
boundaries. Apps for the iPad and iPhone often prevent the 
user from inspecting stored data other than through the 
filters of the application itself. The market models of 
interactive digital products (such as the AppStore) are 
gradually integrated with those of digitized content delivery 
(such as iTunes), and the company deploys proprietary 
services such as cloud storage, user account authentication 
and so on, on top of these. The ecosystem players – Apple, 
Google, Facebook and Microsoft – are all attempting to 
establish their control through a combination of storage, 
behaviour and authentication services that are starting to 
rely on indexed models of other people’s data. 
This is a more serious problem than the commonplace 
observation that “if you are not paying for it, you’re not the 
customer; you're the product being sold” (e.g. [19]). While 
national and international legal frameworks focus on 
outdated models of content protection (through copyright 
and licensing) and service provision (through free trade and 
tariff agreements), the primary mechanism of control over 
users comes through statistical index models that are not 
currently inspected or regulated. The regulated revenue 
models of whole industries are being disrupted by digital 
alternatives that bypass retail distribution with proprietary 
indexing and access (e.g. Spotify, YouTube and others). 
The underlying models are transnational, with the 
corporations increasingly resembling the zaibatsu of 
William Gibson’s cyberspace, rendering national 
jurisdictions irrelevant in comparison with the internal 
structure of ML models.  
This is a concern that is likely to become far more pressing 
after implementation of the proposed Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership, which would allow 
corporations to sue a country whose laws obstruct their 
interests. As a result, the significance of this analysis 
extends beyond the purely commercial, to the political 
foundations of our economic system [24]. When we replace 
content with services that obscure individual authorship 
through the construction of statistical models, Carlo 
Vercellone [38] observes that we are developing a new 
form of cognitive capitalism, in which access to the 
proprietary infrastructure encoded in models and indexes 
operates as a rent – extracting surplus value from the labor 
of the majority. The owner of the statistical model used to 
index and rank content, as in the case of Google’s 
PageRank, thus becomes a rentier, rather than a proprietor, 
of digital content [31]. 
QUESTION 4: SELF-DETERMINATION 
The previous section has offered a relatively traditional 
Marxian analysis of what we might consider to be humane, 
in relation to economic exploitation of many people by a 
few. However, the original case study also draws attention 
to the ways in which ‘mind-reading’ technologies hold 
implications for the psychological identity of the user. This 
section considers implications of Machine Learning 
technologies for the self, as a psychological rather than 
purely legal and economic construct. 
Sense of Agency 
The first of these is the perception of agency – the sense of 
one’s self as an undivided and persisting entity, in control 
of one’s own actions. This is a key element of mental 
health, and is often disrupted in those suffering from 
delusional syndromes such as schizophrenia. In previous 
research, we have shown that diagnostic devices used to 
measure reduced sense of agency in psychiatric illnesses 
can also be used to measure the user’s sense of agency 
when interacting with ML systems [13].  
The behavior of many ML-based systems is determined, not 
only by models of the external world, but by statistical user 
models that predict the user’s own actions. Those 
predictions may be based on data collected from other 
people (as in the case of Kinect), or one’s own past habits. 
However, in all of these cases, one frequent outcome is that 
the resulting system behavior becomes perversely more 
difficult for the user to predict. Rather than an explicit rule 
formulated and symbolically expressed by a designer, the 
behavior is encoded in the parameters of a statistical model 
– the kind of model that Breiman [7] describes as 
“complex, mysterious, and, at least, partly unknowable”. 
The result is frequently useful, but can also be surprising, 
confusing or irritating – as often noted of auto-correct [22]. 
Whether or not the result is immediately useful, the work of 
Coyle et al [13] shows that these ML-based predictions 
reduce the user’s sense of agency in his or her own actions. 
Furthermore, some classes of user may be excluded from 
opportunities to control the system, because the prior data 
from which the trained model has been constructed does not 
take account of their own situation. One such example is 
those Kinect users whose body shapes are not consistent 
with the training data of the system, for example because 
they have absent limbs. 
These cases draw attention to the ways in which, when 
interacting with an inferred model, the user is effectively 
submitting to a comparison between their own actions and 
those of other people from which the model has been 
derived. In many such comparisons, the statistical effect 
will be a regression toward the mean – the distinctive 
characteristics of the individual will be adjusted or 
corrected toward the expectations encoded in the model.  
Construction of Identity 
This is the second of the ‘psychological’ problems that I 
suggest arise when interacting with an inferred world. The 
processes through which we construct our own individual 
identity depend on the perception that we are distinct 
individuals rather than interchangeable members of a 
homogeneous society. Processes of individuation, in which 
we separate ourselves from family and from others, are 
central to the achievement of maturity and personhood. 
These processes can be damaged through institutional and 
systemic constraints, leading to a widespread concern for 
self-determination as a fundamental human right. 
If the construction of one’s personal identity is achieved 
substantially through narratives in digital media – through 
Facebook profiles, photo streams, blogs, Twitter feeds and 
so on – then the behavior of these systems becomes a key 
component of self-determination. To some extent, digital 
media users are highly aware of the need to ‘curate their 
lives’ in the presentation of such content. However, they are 
less able to control the ML models that are inferred from 
their online behavior. At a trivial level, these models may 
record unintentional or private actions that the user would 
prefer to disown. At a more profound level, regressions to 
the mean result in personal identities that are trivialized 
(cute animals and saccharine sunsets), or have pandered to a 
lowest common denominator of mass-market segmentation 
(prurience and porn). 
QUESTION 5: DESIGNING FOR CONTROL 
The previous sections have referred to examples of 
interactive software, although the original case study was 
not itself proposed as an interactive system. This section 
considers two specific issues that arise when a user needs to 
operate products that have been built using ML techniques 
Control 
The anxieties regarding loss of control in inference-based 
interfaces are already well-established: small-scale 
behaviors such as Microsoft’s Clippy, Amazon 
recommendations, or predictive text errors become the 
object of popular ridicule, tinged only slightly with the 
anxiety of disempowerment. 
However, case studies in which the user’s own needs are 
modeled point to the issues that arise when more complex 
or larger-scale system behaviors are determined through 
ML techniques. Since the system behavior is derived from 
data, if the user wishes to control or modify that behavior, 
they must do so at one remove, by modifying the data rather 
than the model. As argued in [4], if the user wishes to 
change the behavior of the system more permanently, then 
ML-based techniques can inadvertently make the task more 
challenging. Rather than simply learning the conventions of 
a scripting or policy language in which to express the 
desired behavior, the user must second-guess an inference 
algorithm, trying to select the right combination of data to 
produce a model corresponding to their needs.  
A well-known early example of this challenge was 
expressed in the Wall Street Journal through advice on ‘If 
TiVo thinks you are gay, here's how to set it straight’ [40]. 
The choice of this specific theme drew attention to the 
implications of surveilling sexual preference, thereby 
conflating the concerns of privacy with those of control. In 
later reports, and in a classic meme formulation, the 
problem has been simplified purely as a matter of 
surveillance: ‘my TiVo thinks I’m gay’. However the TiVo 
developers at the time experimented with a ‘Teach TiVo’ 
function that could be used to modify the inferred model. 
Although briefly released in a beta version, the company 
eventually focused on refining the algorithms, rather than 
offering explicit control to users1. 
Contracts 
The problem of how a user can express the behavior they 
want extends also to the legal relationship between users 
and service providers. As already noted in the earlier 
discussion of authorship, the structure of legal frameworks 
relies on symbolic representation rather than statistical 
patterns. Service providers now offer end-user license 
agreements that describe the procedures for collecting data 
rather than the implications of the model that will be trained 
from that data. Observation of user behavior, and data-
mining from content, have become completely routine, to 
the extent that it is hardly possible for users to opt out of 
this functionality if they want the product to work. 
At present, these universal license agreements do not help 
the user to understand what benefits they (or others) will 
obtain from the resulting inferred models [18]. They also 
provide no option for customizing or restricting either the 
model or the contract – the user may opt in or out, but not 
select any other trade-off between self-determination and 
convenience. This appears to be a joint failure of technical 
and legal systems, failing to recognize the interdependence 
of the two that arises from interacting with the world 
through an inferred model. 
TOWARD HUMANE INTERACTION 
The ‘mind-reading’ case study that provided my initial 
example has the character of a parlor trick, albeit one that I 
have used to introduce some genuine ethical and legal 
issues. To reiterate the real concern for interactive systems: 
when an ML system sees the world we see, and also 
observes our responses, the expectation is that it will make 
predictions about us, and about what we want and need. 
This inferred model mediates our interaction with the world 
and with others. 
I have drawn attention to numerous ways in which the shift 
from direct symbolic expression to inferred statistical 
models of the world has changed the nature of the 
relationship between interactive digital systems and the 
                                                            
1 Personal communication, Jennifer Rode, 20 Feb 2015. 
people that use them. These include questions about the 
source of the data in those statistical models, attributions of 
authorship and agency, the political consequences of shifts 
to non-symbolic expression, and the effects on the identity 
of the individual as constructing their own self and 
controlling their digital lives. 
I have suggested that these shifts result in systems that are 
less humane, because of the ways in which the relationship 
between the system behavior and human activities has 
become obscured through the scale and complexity of the 
modeling process. ML models have become less 
accountable, open to exploitation by commercial actors, 
closed to legal inspection, and resistant to the directly 
expressed desires of the user. 
However, the goal of this paper has been to offer a 
technically-informed critical commentary, as a supplement 
to the many existing critiques that address more traditional 
dystopian anxieties of control and surveillance. Rather than 
simply sounding further warning alarms, or lamenting the 
loss of a golden age of symbolic transparency, a 
technically-informed critique should be able to draw 
attention to opportunities for technical adjustment, caution, 
correction and allowance.  
In the following sections, technical considerations are 
therefore presented as ways in which the structure of the 
inferred model might be opened up – more open to 
understanding by users and to critical assessment by 
commentators. Where symbolic systems offered direct 
representations of knowledge, ML systems must be 
inspected in terms of their statistical structure. 
Features 
A classic student exercise in the GOFAI days was to ask 
how a machine vision system might recognize a chair. If the 
initial answer described four legs, with a seat and a back, 
the tutor would ask what about a stool, or one with three 
legs, or a bean bag2? Eventually the student might offer a 
functional description – something a person is sitting on. 
But then what about a person sitting on a table, or resting 
on a bicycle? The discussion might end with 
Wittgensteinian reflections on language, but the key 
insights are a) that judgments are made in relation to sets of 
features, and b) that accountability for a judgment is 
achieved by reference to those features. 
In the case of statistically inferred models, the features can 
often be far more surprising. One of the greatest technical 
changes in the transition from GOFAI to ML systems has 
been the discovery that many very small features are often a 
reliable basis for inferred classification models (e.g. [21]). 
However, the result is that it becomes difficult to account 
for decisions in a manner recognizable from human  
                                                            
2 This example is taken from a class taught by Peter Andreae at 
Victoria University of Wellington in 1986. 
 
Figure 2. Two images synthesized such that they will 
result in a classification judgment of ‘school bus’ (from 
[26], reproduced with permission of the authors). 
perception. A recent publication illustrated this 
phenomenon with images such as Fig. 2, and the title ‘Deep 
neural networks are easily fooled: High confidence 
predictions for unrecognizable images’ [26]. 
Although neither of the images in Fig. 2 is recognizable as a 
school bus, the image on the right offers a more visually 
salient account of those features in the training data set 
which have been encoded in the training process. They 
allow a human viewer to recall, for example, that school 
buses in the USA are painted in a characteristic color, and 
furthermore to speculate that this ML classifier might not 
be effective in other countries where those colors are not 
used. In contrast, the image on the left in Fig. 2 does not 
provide a basis for this kind of assessment (the original 
paper includes many similar noise-based images that 
represent different categories, while being indistinguishable 
to a human viewer). 
Contrasts of this kind point toward the design opportunity 
for more humane ML systems that reveal the nature of the 
features from which judgments have been derived. It is 
often the case that such features do not satisfy the symbolic 
expectations underlying representational user interfaces. 
The semiotic structure of interaction with inferred worlds 
can only be well-designed if feature encodings are 
integrated into that structure. 
Labeling 
The models underlying many ML-based systems have been 
constructed from sets of training data, where each example 
in the data set is labeled according to a so-called ‘ground 
truth,’ often an expert judgment (this is characteristic of 
supervised learning algorithms – I discuss unsupervised 
learning below). The inferred model, however complex it 
might be, is essentially a summary of those expert 
judgments. However, it is expensive to label large data sets, 
so the availability of suitable labels often determines the 
models that can be obtained. For example, in the case of 
natural language processing systems, the ML model that is 
most often used to assign a part-of-speech (POS) to 
individual words (POS-tagging) is based on a training set 
from the Wall Street Journal. When applied to the speech 
of people who do not talk like the WSJ, the accuracy of this 
model will be reduced. But it is unlikely that expert judges 
would invest expensive time labeling (for example) the 
street patois of a Brazilian favela, even if there were a 
standard textbook description of its linguistic syntax. 
The phrase ‘ground truth’ implies a degree of objectivity 
that may or may not be justified for any particular labeled 
data set. If the interpretation of a case is ambiguous, then 
that training item must either be excluded from the data set 
(a common expedient), or labeled in a way that discounts 
the ambiguity – perhaps because the expert has not even 
noticed the problem. Furthermore, expert judges may 
approach a data set with different intentions from those who 
will interact with the resulting model. One might ask 
whether these experts are representatives of the same social 
class as the user, or whether their judgments are dependent 
on implicit context, perhaps uninformed by situations that 
they have never experienced. 
Moreover, labeling large data sets is tedious and expensive, 
to a degree that those with broader expertise of judgment 
might be reluctant to spend their own valuable time in such 
activity. As a result, many researchers resort to the use of 
online labor markets such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(AMT), to commission ‘human intelligence tasks’. This 
strategy casts further doubt on the presumption of ground 
truth, through the economic relations in which it is 
embedded. For example, when the AMT service was 
introduced, it was formally available only to users in North 
America, with the result that statistical models labeled by 
AMT workers might incorporate an embedded form of 
cultural imperialism, perhaps of the kind illustrated in the 
black and yellow ‘school bus’ category of Fig. 2. 
Confidence 
Many of the symbolic models created in the early days of 
GOFAI were deterministic – a particular output was known 
to have resulted from a given range of inputs, and those 
inputs were guaranteed always to produce the same output. 
In contrast, the behavior of inference-based systems is 
probabilistic, with a likelihood of error that varies 
according to the quality of the match between the inferred 
model and the observed world. This match will always be 
approximate, because the model is only a summary of the 
world, not an exact replica. (In fact, training a model until it 
does replicate the observed world is ‘over-fitting’ – it 
results in a fragile model that performs poorly at handling 
new data). 
Despite the fact that inferred judgments can carry varying 
degrees of confidence, many interactive systems obscure 
this fact. In situations where the behavior of the system 
results from choosing the most likely of several 
possibilities, it might benefit the user to know that this 
behavior resulted from one 51% likelihood being compared 
to a 49% alternative, as distinct from another case where 
the model predicts one choice with 99% likelihood. Some 
of the most successful examples of inference-based 
interaction, including predictive text and search engines, 
offer the user a list of choices that have been ranked 
according to relative confidence. However, these systems 
do not currently scale the ranked choices in proportion to 
the magnitude of the prediction. MacKay’s Dasher is an 
alternative example of a model-based predictive text entry 
system that directly exposes the confidence of the 
prediction in the user interface, by varying the size on 
screen of the different choices [36]. 
The challenge for incorporating confidence in an interactive 
system is to do so unobtrusively, allowing the user to take 
account of relevant cues without information overload. 
However, in order to establish this as a design opportunity, 
we first need to acknowledge that confidence does vary, 
and that probabilistic inferred models should not be 
presented as though they were deterministic. 
Errors 
Decisions made on the basis of an inferred model will 
include errors. Research results in ML conventionally 
report the degree of accuracy in the model (80%, 90%, 99% 
etc). However, the user’s experience of such models is 
often determined by the consequence of the errors, rather 
than the occasions on which the system acts as expected.  
90% accuracy is considered a good result in much ML 
research, but using such models in an interactive system 
means that one in ten user actions will involve correcting a 
mistake. User experience researchers understand the need to 
focus on breakdowns, rather than routine operation, 
although in the past these have tended to result from 
indeterminacy in human behavior, rather than in the 
behavior of the system itself. It is important to recognize 
that departures from routine are more costly to manage than 
routine operation, because they require conscious attention 
from the user [5]. A system that mostly behaves as 
expected, with occasional departures, may be less useful 
than one that has no intelligence at all. Furthermore, it is 
possible that a 1% error rate will be even more dangerous 
than a 10% error rate, because the operator may become 
complacent or inattentive to the possibility of error. 
Deep Learning 
The above discussion of features and labeling applies to the 
ML research techniques most popular in the early 2000's 
(and now widely applied in commercial practice), but it 
should be noted that recent algorithms in the broad category 
of ‘Deep Learning’ (including deep belief networks, 
convolutional neural networks and many others) raise 
somewhat different issues. Deep Learning techniques aim 
to be less dependent on explicit feature encoding, and also 
emphasise the importance of unsupervised learning, so that 
a labeled training set is not needed. However, each of these 
attributes leads to further questions for the critical technical 
practitioner.  
The first problem is that, just as it is not possible for a 
human to gain information about the world unmediated by 
perception, it is difficult for a Deep Learning algorithm to 
gain information about the world that is unmediated by 
features of one kind or another. These ‘perceptual’ features 
may result from signal conditioning, selective sampling, 
optical mechanics, survey design, stroke capture – because 
every process for capturing and recording data implicitly 
carries ‘features’ that have been embedded in the data 
acquisition architecture through technical means. If the 
features have not been explicitly encoded as a component 
of the ML system, then it is necessary for the critic to ask 
where they have been encoded. The questions already asked 
with regard to obfuscation of the model perhaps become 
more urgent, in that only the designers of the associated 
hardware may be able to provide an answer. 
The second challenge in assessing Deep Learning systems 
is that, if the judgments are not made by humans, they must 
be obtained from some other source. In one of the most 
impressive applications of convolutional neural networks, 
the staff of DeepMind Technologies [23] demonstrated a 
system that can learn to play early Atari video games 
without any explicit human intervention (other than 
drawing attention to the score – which is a crucial factor).  
Examples of this kind are often discussed with the 
expectation that the next step after a video game will be 
action in the real world. Similar assumptions were often 
made in the GOFAI era, although that focus on ‘toy worlds’ 
was eventually abandoned, in recognition that operating ‘in 
the wild’ was overwhelmingly more challenging. This quite 
obviously applies to the case of Atari game worlds, and 
perhaps such toy applications do not seem a matter for 
serious concern. However, we do have reason to be 
concerned if similar algorithms are applied to some of the 
other representational ‘games’ played in contemporary 
society, such as the representational game worlds of 
corporate finance, audience ratings, or welfare benefits, and 
the ‘scores’ that are assigned to them in financial markets or 
monetarist government. 
So critical questions in the analysis of Deep Learning 
systems can be set alongside those of earlier ML 
techniques: 1) what is the ontological status of the model 
world in which the Deep Learning system acquires its 
competence; 2) what are the technical channels by which 
data is obtained; and 3) in what ways do each of these differ 
from the social and embodied perceptions of human 
observers? Each of these questions represents a deeply 
humane concern with respect to the representational status 
of inferred models and the degree to which we are obliged 
to interact with such models. 
Summary 
The relationship between inferred models, and the data that 
they are derived from, is complex. The model is already a 
summarized version of the original data, although this is not 
a summary that is directly readable in the manner of a 
symbolic representation. 
It is possible for users to interpret and interact with such 
models in a way that places more emphasis on human 
concerns, but this requires designs that communicate 
essential characteristics of the model. Important aspects 
include the features that have been used to train the model, 
the source of the data in which those features were 
observed, the expert judgments that were applied when 
labeling the ground truth, the degree of confidence in any 
particular application of the model, the specific likelihood 
of errors in the resulting behavior, the infrastructure 
through which input data was acquired, and the semiotic 
status of the representational worlds in which an 
unsupervised model apparently acts. 
DESIGN RESOURCES FOR INTERACTIVE ML 
This paper has presented an historical argument for a new 
critical turn in HCI, that steps aside from the 
preoccupations of symbolic GOFAI and draws attention to 
the consequences of interacting with the inferred models 
derived from ‘big data’. It has investigated a number of 
specific problems that arise in such models, where these 
problems are also attuned to the ways in which distinctions 
between data and control, or content and services, are 
changing in the digital economy and regulation of the 
Internet.  
This analysis suggests the need for design considerations 
that might help users to engage with inferred models in a 
way that is better informed, more effective, and supports 
their human rights to act as individuals. We need improved 
conceptual constructs that can be used to account for a new 
designed relationship between user intentions and inferred 
models. The following suggestions are drawn from work 
carried out in the author’s research group, in order to 
provide concrete illustrations of the kind of design research 
that might take account of these considerations.  
One such construct is the notion of agency – if the machine 
acts on the basis of a world model that is derived from 
observations of other users (or from the assumptions of an 
expert labeler), then this will be perceived by the user as a 
proportionate loss of personal agency through control of 
one's own actions. Fundamental human rights of identity, 
self-determination and attribution are implicated in this 
construct. If the inferred model obfuscates such relations, 
then they should be restored through another channel. 
A second construct is the interaction style previously 
described as programming by example – where future 
automated behaviors are specified by inference from 
observations of user action. Often promoted as an idealised 
personal servant, many such systems struggle to allow the 
basic courtesies of personal service, such as asking for 
confirmation of a command, or responding to a change of 
mind. Empowering users through such techniques will 
involve explicit representation of the inferred requirements 
and actions. 
A third construct is the recognition that, although 
approximate and errorful inferred models of the user’s 
intentions are problematic and worrisome, humans 
themselves also develop world models on the basis of 
incomplete and selective data. Kahneman's investigations of 
heuristics and biases in human decision-making [17] offer a 
mirror to the inferred world model of ML systems. There is 
a valuable opportunity to create user interfaces that 
acknowledge and support such human reasoning styles, 
rather than attempting to correct the user on the basis of 
unseen data or expert design abstractions. 
A fourth construct is to reconsider the role of the state, in 
an era when neither intellectual property nor legal policies 
need be explicitly formulated as symbolic representations. 
The new status of content that underlies inferred models 
throws new light on the role of public service broadcasters, 
who should be in a position to establish and protect genuine 
public value in the public domain [6]. 
These four illustrative examples are not proposed as the 
basis for a unified theoretical framework to be adopted by 
future design researchers. The intention is rather to provide 
a relatively pragmatic set of observations and suggestions, 
showing connections between the ideas in this paper and 
established topics within mainstream interaction design and 
digital media studies. Hopefully there are many other such 
opportunities, which may indeed come together to offer a 
basis for future design frameworks and methods. 
CONCLUSION 
The central technical assumptions that underpinned the 
design of software applications for the first 50 years of the 
computer industry are now largely outdated. The 
intellectual agenda of data processing and communications, 
in which users either interact with each other or make 
choices between defined system functions, has not been 
succeeded by the autonomous human-like AI that was 
anticipated in the 1950s. Of course, HCI has always resisted 
such ambitions, drawing attention to the pragmatic human 
needs of social conversation and embodied usability. 
In the new technical environment of the 21st century, users 
increasingly interact with statistical models of the world 
that have been inferred from a wide variety of data sources 
rather than explicit design judgments. This situation forces 
us to attend to the politics of information and action, as well 
as the attributes and limitations of the inference systems 
themselves. Just as the technical competence required of 
engineers is shifting from data and algorithms to 
information theory and stability analysis, so user experience 
designers must reconceive the relationship between content 
and services as constituting an ‘inferred world’ that stands 
in rich semiotic relation to individual and collective 
experience.  
Doing so requires a philosophical framework in which 
labour, identity and human rights are recognized as central 
concerns of the digital era – concerns that are directly 
challenged by recent developments in engineering thinking. 
In short, we need a discipline of humane computer 
interaction. 
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